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a signal increases the chances of success. In an online dating experiment, participants can attach “virtual
roses” to a proposal to signal special interest in another participant. We find that attaching a rose to
an offer substantially increases the chance of acceptance. This effect is driven by an increase in the
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Signaling private information that is relevant to others is a large research topic not only in 
economics, but in other disciplines as well. There are two ways in which signaling has been 
studied. The first is costly signaling (see Spence, 1973) where agents undertake various actions, 
in general visible to all participants, whose costs depend on the underlying trait to be signaled. 
Such costly signaling has, for example, been used as a partial explanation for education (for an 
early overview see Weiss, 1995), conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899) and even in biology 
with the famous extravagance of a peacock tail being the most prominent example of phenomena 
to be explained (Zahavi, 1975). Despite this broad application, it has been difficult to measure the 
extent to which signaling accounts for these phenomena.
1 A second and more recent approach is 
preference signaling (see Avery and Levin, 2009, and Coles, Kushnir and Niederle, 2011). In 
such models agents undertake an action, sending a signal, to a few specific agents that are in 
general not observable to anyone but the signal recipient. More importantly, the costs of sending 
signals are the same for all agents, often even zero, though the number of signals is limited and so 
they have opportunity costs. A prominent example of preference signals is college admission, 
where applying to universities early can be viewed as a signal, and lower SAT scores of students 
accepted through early admission suggests that colleges respond to them (Avery and Levin 2009). 
A second example is the economics job market where students can send signals to universities 
hoping to increase their chance to receive an interview for that position (Coles et al., 2010). 
However, the empirical literature on preference signaling has had an even harder time in showing 
that an agent has more success when the agent sent a signal. Given that it is difficult to show that 
costly signals sway decisions of other agents it may not be surprising that the empirical literature 
                                                 
1 When trying to assess the empirical value of a costly signal such as a diploma in the labor literature, an 
ideal test would be to randomly assign diploma. While this may be ethically problematic, passing scores for 
the GED (Graduate Equivalency Degree) do vary. The first study to exploit such variation found a large 
signaling value for a GED (Tyler, Murnane, and Willett, 2000). Some subsequent papers seem to suggest 
smaller or no returns (e.g. Tyler, 2004, and Jepsen, Mueser, and Troske, 2010). More recently, exploiting 
variation in passing scores of high school exit exams, Martorell and Clark (2010) find a positive, though 
not large signaling value. In the biology literature, signaling models are tested by showing, for example, 
that the extravagance of a peacock train is a good predictor for its popularity as a mating partner. A long 
train has a negative effect on aerodynamic efficiency, which suggests that it is a valid sign of bird health 
(Balmford et al., 1993, and Thomas, 1993). However, the question is whether mating a peacock with an 
extravagant train leads to more healthy offspring, either because of good genes or less infectious diseases 
that may threaten the peahen. In general, it has been difficult to confirm the signaling theory in a coherent 
fashion (Johnstone, 1995). Indeed, there are other explanations for the extravagant peacock train that have 
nothing to do with signaling such as the runaway selection theory (Fisher, 1915, and Lande, 1981). In terms 
of conspicuous consumption, a recent test suggesting that it may serve as a status signal is given by 
Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (forthcoming). Starting with the observation that Blacks and Hispanics 
devote larger shares of their expenditure bundles to visible goods than comparable Whites, they show that 
visible consumption declines as the income of the reference group rises. The latter being a key prediction of 
the status signaling model (see also Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996). 3 
 
on preference signals had similar difficulties. The goal of this paper is to provide empirical 
evidence that sending a preference signal can considerably improve the chances of success. 
We present a field experiment on dating. A major online dating company in Korea 
organized two special dating events with 613 participants, of which about 50 percent were 
female. Participants were endowed with two “virtual roses” and a randomly chosen 20 percent 
with eight. Hence, roses are signals that everyone could send for free to anyone and roses are 
costly only because they were in limited supply. A participant could send dating requests to up to 
10 different people by sending a pre-made electronic note, a proposal. Participants could attach at 
most one virtual rose, a digital image icon, when sending a proposal. The roses were described as 
a way to show special interest. We show that attaching a rose to a proposal improved the chance 
of a proposal to be accepted. Furthermore, participants benefitted from having more roses. 
Anecdotal evidence that sending a preference signal improves the outcome of a signaler 
has been provided by Roth and Xing (1997) who studied a market in which employers – clinical 
psychology program directors – face congestion, that is, may not be able to make all the offers 
needed to fill their positions with the most desirable candidates. They documented that directors 
of a specific internship program deviated from their original desirability order over candidates 
and instead made offers to candidates who indicated they would accept such an offer while higher 
ranked candidates were still available. In college admission, Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser 
(2003) documented many ways in which colleges try to assess the preferences of students when 
deciding whom to admit. An important channel is the option any student has to apply to that 
college through early admission, though in general students are allowed to apply early to one 
college only. Students that are accepted through early admission have lower SAT scores than 
those accepted through regular admission, suggesting that sending a signal increases the 
acceptance rate. Avery and Levin (2009) propose a preference signaling model that is consistent 
with many stylized facts of college admission.
2 There could, however, be other differences across 
students who apply early or late, such as the need for financial aid (Avery, Fairbanks and 
Zeckhauser, 2003).
3 The American Economic Association (AEA) introduced a signaling 
mechanism for the economics job market in 2006. Specifically, every student is able to signal to 
two universities of their choice. The problem is that most economics departments receive 
applications from more suitable candidates than they can interview. This means they have to 
                                                 
2 Early admission can also come in the flavor where students promise to accept if a college were to make an 
early offer. Aiming for such more consequential signals is ubiquitous. For example, in the market for law 
clerks, preference signaling of that form is often made credible by using faculty “brokers” or social 
connections (Avery et al., 2001). 
3 Kim (2010) focuses on early admission as a screening device for students who do or do not require 
financial aid. Lee (2009) uses winner’s curse type arguments to account for early admission.  4 
 
decide to not interview many promising candidates for fear of filling interview slots with 
applicants that have no particularly strong interest in the position. When deciding whom to 
interview, information pertaining to the preferences of candidates about the position can be 
helpful. Hence, signals may be especially useful when a candidate that looks very promising 
sends it to his first choice school among those that may not interview the candidate believing the 
candidate to be out of reach.
4 While there is positive evidence that sending a signal improves the 
chances to receive an interview at the AEA meetings, and that departments pay attention to 
signals, the evidence is rather suggestive and often lacks proper controls due to data restrictions 
(Coles et al., 2010).
5  
Compared to other environments, our set-up offers three major advantages to test the 
impact of preference signaling. First, we were able to collect a wide range of information about 
participants, and furthermore, participants are probably less likely to have information about each 
other that is not observed. Second, even though the market is decentralized, we observe not only 
accepted proposals, but all proposals, because the market operates on the website of the dating 
company. Third, we were able to randomly select participants whom we endowed with eight 
roses when others received only two. Such an intervention may be ethically more problematic in 
labor or education markets.
6 This, however, will provide clean evidence that preference signaling 
with virtual roses has an impact on matching outcomes. Beside these three advantages, our study 
of online dating may itself be economically relevant because an important economic variable, 
marriage, is a result of dating,
7 and because online dating services are rapidly growing throughout 
the world.
8  
                                                 
4  The AEA offers advice to participants that includes: “The two signals should not be thought of as 
indicating your top two choices. Instead, you should think about which two departments that you are 
interested in would be likely to interview you if they receive your signal, but not otherwise (see advice to 
departments, above). You might therefore want to send a signal to a department that you like but that might 
otherwise doubt whether they are likely to be able to hire you.” (see 
http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/signal/signaling.pdf). 
5 Coles et al (2010) show that applicants who sent a signal to an employer are more likely to receive an 
interview there than at places they would have sent a signal had they a third one. Like in other studies on 
preference signaling, there is a lack of information to which other universities students applied and where 
they received offers from. For other examples on preference signaling see Coles, Kushnir and Niederle 
(2011).  
6 The main difference between the dating and the employment environment is that a dating market is more 
continuous. As such any dating website is portioning off a fraction of the “natural” dating market and 
manipulating it. It is much more problematic to influence a national or even international market such as 
the economics junior market that operates once a year and may have a large impact on careers.   
7 Marriage has received some attention following the seminal work by Becker (1973). Examples include 
Abramitzky et al. (2009), Angrist (2002), Banerjee et al. (2009), Choo and Siow (2006), Fernandez et al., 
(2005), Fisman et al. (2006) and (2008), Hitsch et al. (2010), Lee (2009) and Wong (2003). 
8 For example, in the U.S., major dating companies have been established since the mid-1990s and the 
market size is expected to be $932 million in 2011 (JupiterResearch, 2007). Online dating services are 5 
 
The experiment consisted of two special online dating sessions for people who are 
college-educated, never-married, Korean, aged between 26 and 38 for men, and 22 and 34 for 
women. We imposed restrictions on participants’ characteristics to reduce heterogeneity in 
observables, which would potentially have segmented the dating market. Based on the 
participants’ observable characteristics, we used the company’s formula to predict the extent to 
which a participant would be desirable to the opposite sex as a dating partner. Using this 
prediction, we assign to a participant a desirability grade of bottom (the least desirable group), 
middle, or top (the most desirable group).  For the first five days of the event, a participant could 
browse profiles and send up to 10 proposals and a proposal could be sent with at most one rose. 
Participants had two roses they could attach to proposals, with a randomly selected twenty 
percent of participants having eight roses. Once this period ended, each participant received his or 
her proposals and observed whether they came with a rose. For the next four days, participants 
decided whether to accept each proposal; and where they could accept at most 10 proposals. After 
the acceptance phase, an accepted proposal resulted in the company sending a text message to 
inform the involved pair of each other’s contact information.  
We predict roses to be useful because our participants in the online dating experiment are 
busy young people who may be careful how to spend their limited spare time. They may only be 
interested in spending time on a date when dates are serious and may turn into a relationship. As 
such, offers from desirable participants may be rejected, out of fear that the interest may not be 
serious enough. Hence, roses may be particularly effective when they are sent to participants that 
are somewhat less desirable than the sender is. We therefore expect roses to be useful the way 
signals might be for economics job market candidates, though of course the dating market differs 
in many ways from entry-level labor markets.  
In our experiment, about 45 percent of participants sent a proposal, where men were 
significantly more active than women. Of those participants (henceforth senders), about 80 
percent used at least one rose. About 65 percent of participants received at least one proposal 
(hereafter recipients), and 31 percent of received proposals came with a rose. While desirability 
had no impact on how many proposals a person made, it was very important for receiving 
proposals. The top desirability group of men received two thirds of all female proposals, and the 
top female group received 45 percent of all proposals. Bottom desirable participants only receive 
5 (15) percent of all proposals when they are male (female). While offers were skewed towards 
more desirable participants, roses were not. Each offer was equally likely to be accompanied by a 
                                                                                                                                                 
popular not only in developed countries but also in developing countries such as Korea, India and China. 6 
 
rose. In total, 295 out of 1,921 proposals resulted in a date and 36 percent of them were sent with 
a rose attached. 
To study the effect of a rose, we compare the acceptance rate of an offer with and without 
a rose using recipient fixed effects and the senders’ desirability grade. We find that, overall, 
sending a proposal with a rose increased the probability that a recipient would accept the proposal 
by 3.3 percentage points, which corresponds to a twenty percent increase in the acceptance rate. 
This effect is similar in magnitude to the increase in the acceptance rate by recipients when the 
dating offer came from a middle rather than bottom desirable sender. This implies that, by 
sending a rose, a bottom group sender will be almost equally attractive as his or her counterpart 
belonging to the middle group. 
A more detailed analysis shows that every recipient group responds positively to roses 
when the proposals were made by senders from a higher desirability group. That is, when a 
sender from the top desirability group made an offer to a middle or bottom desirable recipient this 
offer was significantly more likely to be accepted when a rose was attached. Likewise for offers 
with and without roses from middle senders to bottom recipients. The effect of a rose in all those 
instances is more than a 50% increase in the acceptance rate, and therefore corresponds to twice 
the increase in the acceptance rate when moving the sender form the bottom to middle desirability 
group. Analyzing the effect of roses on proposers instead of proposals, we show directly that 
participants with more roses were more successful, in that they had more dates that they initiated.  
  The experiment on internet dating shows unambiguously that preference signaling, where 
everyone can send signals for free, though signals are limited in numbers, can impact the 
outcome. Senders are able to convey information to recipients using preference signals and 
recipients react to signals. This is a necessary step to hope that a market intervention that 
introduces a signaling mechanism can have an effect on the final outcome. The rest of this paper 
is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the experiment. Section 3 reports who proposed 
to whom, and what determines whether a rose was attached. Section 4 analyzes the effect of a 
rose. Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
II.A BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
We conducted a field experiment at a major online dating company in South Korea that 
also operates in China, Singapore and the United States. Since 1991, the company has been 
helping clients to find spouses among clients of the opposite sex. The company provides two 
types of memberships: regular and special. The main differences between the two are the 7 
 
membership cost, the length of service, the degree of the company’s involvement in a client’s 
search process, and the depth of supporting documents for legal verification of a client’s 
information. A regular membership lasts for one year and costs about $900, whereas a special 
membership is for a one time dating event which occurs for example at Valentine’s Day, during 
the summer vacation season and Christmas.  
For regular members the company suggests “suitable” dating partners based on its 
matching algorithm. To match members the company creates an index (herein, desirability 
index), which is a sex-specific weighted sum of a person’s characteristics many of which have to 
be legally verified.
9 The desirability index is intended to predict how attractive a person would be 
to the opposite sex as a spouse. It ranges from 0 (least desirable) to 100 (most desirable). The 
desirability index is not visible to members of the dating site. Using a dataset from the company 
(separate from the experiment) collected by Lee (2009), we find that the desirability index is a 
good predictor of whether a client is attractive as a dating partner (see Section 1 of the online 
appendix).  
Special members who can only participate in special dating events are asked the same set 
of questions as regular members, but are not required to answer them all, and can also fail to 
submit some of the legal documents. The company constructs a verification score that is posted 
on the member’s profile and ranges from 0 (no legal verification) to 100 (full legal verification).
10 
 
II.B EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Procedure 
  In the summer of 2008, the company advertised two sessions of the field experiment in 
Korea as one of its special dating events with a participation fee of $50. We limited participants 
to be Korean, college educated, never married and aged from 26 to 38 for men and 22 to 34 for 
women. We imposed these restrictions to reduce heterogeneity among participants and create a 
thick market. While this may make it easier for participants to find a good match, it may also 
imply that participants may not have sufficient time to date all desirable candidates. 
  Each session of the experiment consisted of two stages: First is a proposal stage which 
                                                 
9 A person’s desirability index is calculated based on earnings, assets, job security (full time job or not), 
height, weight, a company-generated score based on the profile picture, a score based on the college 
attended and the chosen major, both of which are highly correlated with the score on the national college 
entry exam, birth order, and family characteristics (parent’s wealth and marital status, and siblings’ 
educational attainment). 
10 To receive 100 percent verification, a participant needs to submit a copy of the national household 
registration form (for age, birth order, marital history and parents’ marital status), diploma (for education) 
and proof of employment (for type of employment and industry).   8 
 
lasted five days; then there is a response stage of four days. In the proposal stage, each participant 
could browse profiles of other participants that contained their submitted information including a 
head-to-shoulder photo and their verification score. Each participant could send a pre-made 
electronic note (herein proposal) asking for a date to up to ten participants of the opposite sex. 
Furthermore, each participant could attach up to one virtual rose per proposal. The virtual roses 
are a preference signaling mechanism specifically introduced for this event.  
  In the response stage, participants received the proposals sent to them and saw whether a 
rose was attached. Participants could accept up to 10 proposals but did not receive any 
information whether any of the proposals they made were accepted. No new proposals could be 
made in the response stage. An accepted proposal (a date) resulted in the company sending a text 
message to the two involved participants about each other’s phone number right after the 
response stage. Given the design, each participant could have at most 20 first dates. 
  By separating the proposal stage from the response stage, participants, when deciding 
whom to make a proposal, could not observe the proposals of others. Similarly, during the 
response stage, participants did not know whether any proposals were accepted or rejected. This 
simplifies the empirical analysis by preventing that a participant may make his or her decisions 
contingent on other participants’ decisions (apart from responding to proposals received in the 
response stage). 
Treatments 
  The innovation in the dating event is to endow participants with virtual roses. The main 
analysis is to assess whether attaching a rose increases the chance that a proposal is accepted. The 
first treatment variable is to change the number of roses participants are endowed with. Eighty 
percent of participants receive two roses, while 20 percent receive eight roses. This allows us to 
directly assess whether participants with eight roses are more likely to have a proposal accepted. 
  To motivate the second variation note that many researchers document that women are 
more passive in dating and seem to mostly react to offers. For instance, Hitsch et al. (2010) found 
that women are less active in initiating a date in a U.S. online dating website, and Fisman et al. 
(2006) and Kurzban and Weeden (2005) found a similar gender gap in speed-dating settings. 
Passivity in initiating dates may have an important implication in marital surplus. Specifically, 
when women and men differ in their preferences over each other, then who marries whom may 
depend on who initiates matches. When marital surplus is not fully transferable, then women may 
be worse off by being passive in the mate search process.
11 We aim to affect the behavior of 
                                                 
11 There may be several core outcomes of who is married to whom, in which case the outcome preferred by 
all men is different from the woman preferred outcome (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, for an overview). 9 
 
women to improve gender equality in the mate search process, which may ultimately be 
important in the household formation and decision process. 
 In  the  female empowerment treatment we randomly selected 50 percent of female 
participants. During the proposal stage, we showed them a banner which was built into the main 
webpage and visible whenever a treated participant was on the website with the aim of 
encouraging them to initiate a proposal.
12 Finally, we have an equivalent treatment for men, 
called male empowerment, encouraging them to accept offers by women. We randomly selected 
50 percent of male participants who during the response stage saw a banner on their website.
13 
Participants were not aware that there were various treatments, nor did they know anyone else’s 
treatment status. 
Data 
  The dataset consists for each participant of their characteristics, desirability index, 
verification score, the list of people to whom the participant sent a proposal and whether a rose 
was attached, the list of people from whom the participant received a proposal and whether a rose 
was attached to the proposal, and for all those proposals, whether or not they were accepted. 
  
II.C PARTICIPANTS 
  There were 212 participants in the first and 401 in the second session. Roughly half of each 
session’s participants were female. Thirty-three men and 25 women participated in both sessions. 
All participants met the participation criteria, apart from four high-school graduates. About 20 
percent of participants of each sex received both eight roses and the empowerment treatment. 
About 37 percent of the remaining participants received two roses and the empowerment 
treatment. All the remaining participants, except for three men, received only two roses.  
To check the randomization into the treatment status, we compare the characteristics of 
the three groups of participants using t-tests:
14 two roses and no empowerment (Group 1), two 
roses and empowerment (Group 2), and eight roses with empowerment (Group 3). We report 
results in Table I.  
For female participants the three treatment groups are not significantly different from one 
                                                                                                                                                 
A dating market in which men make offers may be closer to achieving the male optimal stable matching, 
the most preferred outcome by men. Lee (2009) provides evidence that matches would be quite different 
when women were to make offers as opposed to men. 
12 The banner read, in translation: “Will you wait until Prince Charming asks you out?  Or, will you take the 
lead to meet him? Dear client, did you find someone you want to date? Please do not let this opportunity 
pass you by. Contact him first and give him the opportunity to meet you.”  
13 The banner read, in translation, “Congratulations! You received a dating request. Please give an 
opportunity to the one who falls in love with your charm!” 
14 Permutation tests yield qualitatively the same results. 10 
 
another in terms of the desirability index or the verification score. Concerning age and location, 
once more, there is no significant difference. For male participants, Groups 1 to 3 are comparable 
in terms of desirability index but differ on the verification score. Furthermore, there are 
differences in age and the likelihood of living in Greater Seoul. In light of these findings, we will 
always control for the characteristics that vary across groups, namely age, verification score and 
location. As long as there is no unobservable heterogeneity across groups, we can study the 
treatment effects by controlling for observable differences. 
TABLE I PARTICIPANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS BY TREATMENT STATUS 
Treatment Status  Group 1 Group 2
a) Group 3
 b)
  Number of roses  2 2 8 
  Perception or Empowerment  No Yes Yes 
Male participants      
 Number of participants  146 97 58 
 Age  32.14 32.07 33.10** 
 Greater Seoul (percent)  84.93 94.85** 81.03***
 Desirability index by the company 75.28 74.45 76.43 
 Special members (percent)  47.26 42.27 19.97***
 Verification – fully-verified (percent) 69.86 61.86 86.21** 
 Verification – not-verified (percent) 2.74 2.06 0.00 
Female participants      
 Number of participants  153 95 61 
 Age  29.54 29.48 30.13* 
 Greater Seoul (percent)  88.24 86.32 81.97 
 Desirability index by the company 78.58 79.62 79.97 
 Special members (percent)  30.72 21.05* 22.95 
 Verification – fully-verified (percent) 67.32 68.42 75.41 
 Verification – not-verified  (percent) 3.27 5.26 1.64 
Notes: The male participants of Groups 1 to 3 do not add up to 304 because three men were endowed with 
eight roses but were not in the empowerment treatment. Greater Seoul includes Seoul and Gyeonggi 
province. In column 2 (Group 2, a) we test whether the characteristics of participants in Group 2 are 
statistically different from those in Group 1. In column 3 (Group 3, b) we do the same for Group 3 
compared to Group 2.  In all cases, *, **, and *** indicate that using a two-sided t-test the difference is 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
III. PROPOSALS AND ROSES 
III.A PARTICIPANT’S TYPE  
For each participant, especially those that are regular members, we have a large number 
of characteristics, many of which are used to compute the desirability index. For regular 
members, we define the type to be their desirability index, age and residential location. There are 
two reasons why we opt to use the desirability index as a summary statistic for how desirable 
participants are to the opposite sex as dating partners. First, we obtained a different and much 
larger sample of regular members that fulfill the requirements of our experiment. We find that the 11 
 
variables we use to define a participants’ type explain almost all the variation of a person’s 
desirability as a dating partner compared to when we use all available characteristics (see Section 
1 of the online appendix). Second, using the desirability index will make the interpretation of our 
results easier, though the findings remain qualitatively the same when we use alternative 
definitions of a participant’s “desirability”, see Section IV. 
In our analysis, we partition participants according to their desirability index into three 
categories within each sex: the bottom 30 percent, the top 30 percent, and the remaining 40 
percent (referred to as bottom, top, and middle, respectively). Since we have also special 
members whose information may not be fully verified, we include this information in the 
participants’ type through three levels: fully, partially, or not at all legally verified.
15 Therefore, 
the type of a participant in the experiment is their desirability index which we group into bottom, 
middle and top, age, residential location and legal verification level. 
 
III.B SENDING PROPOSALS AND ROSES 
  Altogether 1,921 proposals are made, of which 66% (1,261) are made by men. Men are in 
fact significantly more active proposers than women on any dimension. They have a higher 
chance to make a proposal, 54.28 percent compared to the female 36.89 percent (p = 0.00).
16 
Conditioning on sending a proposal, men send more proposals than women, 7.64 compared to 
5.79 (p = 0.00).
17 Figure I.A shows for each decile of the desirability index the percent of 
proposals made by participants of that level of desirability or lower.
18 Because the graph aligns 
with the 45 degree line, this suggests that one’s own desirability is not a determining factor when 
deciding whether and how many proposals to make.  
  The regressions on sending proposals reported in Table II confirm the gender differences 
and that the proposers own desirability is not a determining factor. We use a linear regression 
model to estimate which participants send at least one proposal, and how many proposals are sent 
                                                 
15 Full verification requires the national household registration form, diploma, and employment 
verification. Partial verification requires the national household registration form. 
16 For all tests on proportions and means, the p-values correspond to a two-sided t-test. The rather careful 
behavior in selecting a dating partner may be due to the participants’ characteristics in our sample. Most 
participants are full-time employees whose age is close to but slightly higher than the average age of first 
marriage in Korea, which implies that they may not want to waste their time on “not-so-good” dating 
partners.  
17 Conditioning on sending a proposal, men are also significantly more likely than women to exhaust their 
proposals (53.94 percent compared to 27.19 percent, p = 0.00).  
18 We divide the desirability index by sex into deciles, where 1 corresponds to the bottom 10 percent of 
desirability index-rated participants. 12 
 
(conditional on sending at least one).
19 The reported gender coefficient of -0.115 in column 1 
shows that women are 11.5 percentage points less likely to send a proposal than men are. Column 
4 shows that conditional on sending a proposal, women send 1.05 less proposals than men. The 
coefficients on the desirability index of the sender (S_Middle and S_Top) are not significant in 
any regression, showing that the desirability of the sender is not a significant predictor whether 
and how many proposals participants make.
20  
 
               Figure I 
Figure I.A: For each decile of desirability, 
where 1 is the least and 10 the most desirable 
group, the cumulative distribution function of 
proposals. 
Figure I.B: For each decile of desirability, 
where 1 is the least and 10 the most 
desirable group, the cumulative distribution 
function of roses.  
 
  Furthermore, while participants with eight roses seem slightly more active on all 
dimensions, only men were significantly more likely to make an offer compared to participants in 
the control who had only two roses. Finally, the empowerment treatment did not affect women in 
terms of whether they made a proposal or how many proposals they made.  
  A rose is attached to 670 proposals. A total of 38.70 percent (478) of proposals made by 
men come with a rose, compared to 27.58 percent (182) of proposals made by women (p = 0.00). 
Conditioning on sending a proposal, men are more likely than women to use at least one rose 
(90.30 compared to 64.91 percent, p = 0.00). Conditional on sending a rose, men are also more 
likely to exhaust their roses, that is use up all their roses or use as many roses as proposals (75.17 
percent versus 47.30 percent, p = 0.00). Once more, when considering who sends roses, Figure 
I.B suggests that participants of all levels of desirability evenly send signals. 
 
                                                 
19 For regressions on whether the participant sent a proposal, that is columns 1 to 3 from Table II, the 
marginal effects from logit and probit models are very similar to the results from the linear probability 
model. 
20 The conclusions are robust to more flexible controls of a participant’s desirability index (such as using a 






















TABLE II SENDING PROPOSALS 
  Sending a proposal  Number of proposals (if > 0) 
Sender  All  Men Women All Men  Women
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Female  -0.115**     -1.050*   
  (0.054)     (0.610)   
Male with 8 roses  0.239***  0.208***   0.677 0.709   
  (0.071)  (0.070)   (0.563) (0.549)   
Female with 8 roses  0.035    0.056 0.388   0.369
  (0.080)    (0.080) (0.838)   (0.898)
Female empowerment  0.037    0.048 -0.23   -0.271
  (0.064)    (0.064) (0.706)   (0.749)
S_ Middle  0.001  -0.058 0.055 -0.264 0.269  -1.007
  (0.048)  (0.068) (0.067) (0.493) (0.630)  (0.805)
S_ Top  0.061  0.073 0.028 -0.138 -0.028  -0.318
  (0.053)  (0.074) (0.074) (0.521) (0.651)  (0.879)
No. of observations  611  304 307 278 165  113
R-sq  0.070  0.100 0.030 0.118 0.060  0.065
Notes: OLS estimates. In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is one if a participant sent at least one 
proposal and zero otherwise. In columns 4 to 6, the dependent variable is the number of proposals a 
participant sent. Female, Male (Female) with 8 roses and Female empowerment are dummies for the 
described condition. S_Middle and S_Top indicate whether the sender is from the middle or top desirability 
group, respectively. All regression models control for the verification level (none, medium, full), age, and a 
living in greater Seoul dummy. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
  
Linear regressions in Table III confirm that women are significantly less likely to send at 
least one rose (column 1), and that participants of all levels of desirability are equally likely to use 
a rose (columns 1 to 3). Men who make more offers are also significantly more likely to use at 
least one rose, while the effect for women, though similar in magnitude, is not significant.
21 
Conditional on using at least one rose and controlling for the number of proposals, women and 
men send a similar number of roses. Specifically, women only send 0.006 fewer roses than men 
(column 4). While desirability so far had no explanatory power, women in the bottom desirability 
group do not send as many roses as those in the middle or top group, conditional on using at least 
one rose (column 6). Similar to the proposal behavior, whether a female participant received the 
empowerment treatment is not a statistically significant predictor for the participant’s usage of 
endowed roses. Finally, conditioning on participants who sent at least one rose, participants with 
eight roses use on average an additional 3.2 (for women) and 4.9 roses (for men). Women with 
eight roses are also somewhat more likely to use at least one rose. This implies that if roses 
                                                 
21 For regressions on whether the participant sent a rose, that is columns 1 to 3 from Table III, the marginal 
effects from logit and probit models are very similar to the results from the linear probability model. 14 
 
increase the chance of an offer to be accepted, participants with more roses should have more of 
their offers accepted, especially if they do not differ in whom they make offers or whom they 
send roses to.  
 
TABLE III SENDING ROSES 
  Sending a rose Number of roses (if > 0)
Sender  All  Men Women All Men  Women
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Female  -0.222***     -0.006   
  (0.072)     (0.238)   
Male with 8 roses  0.031  0.035   4.936*** 4.973***   
  (0.066)  (0.051)   (0.197) (0.175)   
Female with 8 roses  0.170*    0.163 3.239***   3.263***
  (0.098)    (0.127) (0.340)   (0.411)
Female empowerment  -0.061    -0.073 0.112   0.168
  (0.083)    (0.106) (0.301)   (0.356)
No of proposals sent  0.019***  0.017** 0.019 0.219*** 0.207***  0.234***
  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.014) (0.023) (0.026)  (0.045)
S_ Middle  0.012  0.056 -0.043 0.368** -0.061  1.272***
  (0.058)  (0.059) (0.114) (0.183) (0.197)  (0.379)
S_ Top  -0.022  -0.079 0.066 0.307 -0.092  1.132***
  (0.061)  (0.061) (0.124) (0.196) (0.211)  (0.402)
No. of Observations  278  165 113 223 149  74
R-sq   0.140  0.080 0.080 0.8219 0.8740  0.7012
Notes: OLS estimates. The sample includes participants who made at least one proposal. In columns 1 to 3, the 
dependent variable is one if a participant sent at least one rose and zero otherwise. In columns 4 to 6, the 
dependent variable is the number of roses a participant sent. Female, Male (Female) with 8 roses and Female 
empowerment are dummies for the described condition. S_Middle and S_Top indicate whether the sender is from 
the middle or top desirability group, respectively. No of proposals sent is the number of proposals that a 
participant made. All regression models control for the verification level (none, medium, full), age, and living in 




III.C WHO RECEIVES PROPOSALS AND ROSES? 
While desirability played little role when determining who sent proposals and roses, it is 
important for receiving proposals. This is a confirmation that within our sample the desirability 
index is a good predictor on how desirable a participant is as a dating partner. Figure II shows the 
cumulative distribution function of proposals received by desirability decile. For both genders the 





For each desirability decile, the cumulative proportion of all offers  
received by recipients of that decile or lower. 
 
Table IV shows for each desirability group of the sender to whom they send proposals. 
Note that we only use 1,902 proposals instead of 1,921, because two female participants who sent 
3 and received 16 proposals had no desirability index. The table shows that for all desirability 
groups, senders are more likely to make proposals to more desirable participants. For example, 
men in the bottom desirability group send 371 proposals, 23.72 percent of which were to women 
in the bottom group, but 35.85 percent to women in the top group. This tendency is more 
prevalent the more desirable the sender is, and when senders are female. Men of each desirability 
group send on average at least a third of their proposals to the middle and a third to the top 
desirability group. Women on the other hand send on average at least half their proposals to the 
most desirable group of men. 
TABLE IV DISTRIBUTION OF PROPOSALS  
   Recipient’s desirability   
Sender  No. of Proposals Bottom Middle Top   
Male          
  - All 1,245 15.42 40.00 44.58   
  - Bottom  371 23.72 40.43 35.85   
  - Middle  450 13.11 42.22 44.67   
  - Top  424 10.61 37.26 52.12   
Female          
  - All 657 5.63 28.31 66.06   
  - Bottom  198 9.09 37.88 53.03   
  - Middle  259 5.79 25.48 68.73   













In Table V we report probit regressions to predict which 1,902 of the possible 102,064 
proposals were actually made, based on sender and recipient characteristics.
22 We use “S_” to 
indicate sender and “R_” to indicate recipient characteristics and report marginal effects.  
We start with the regression that includes all participants in the first column. The positive 
marginal coefficients of 0.012 of “R_Top” means that a sender in the bottom group is 1.2 
percentage points more likely to make an offer to a specific recipient if that recipient is in the top 
rather than bottom desirability group. A sender in the top group is R_Top plus S_Top X R_Top, 
that is, 3.4 percentage points more likely to make an offer to a recipient in the top rather than the 
bottom desirability group. Overall, column 1 confirms the results from Tables II and IV that 
senders are more likely to make offers to more desirable recipients, and the more so, the more 
desirable they are themselves. When we restrict attention to men only, this effect is significant. 
Women, on the other hand, already send so many proposals to top recipients, that only top 
desirable women are even more likely to make offers to top desirable men.
23 
 The negative effect of 0.003 of “S_female” means that for a given pair of participants, 
the woman is 0.3 percentage points less likely to contact the man than the man is to contact the 
woman. Table V further shows that men and women endowed with eight roses are more likely to 
make a proposal. Female empowerment, however, has no significant effect. 
In the last three columns (columns 4 to 6), we restrict the sample to senders who sent at 
least one proposal.
24  All initial results are strengthened. However, the female dummy is now 
positive and significant. This is due to the restriction that the coefficients of other controls do not 
depend on gender. If we allow for the possibility that women send offers to middle and top 
desirable partners differently than men, that is include interaction terms such as S_female X 
R_Middle and S_female X R_Top, the marginal effect on the female dummy is negative, -0.14 
and significant (p = 0.01 of the underlying coefficient with a standard error of the marginal effect 
of 0.00). 
Being endowed with eight roses may not only affect whether senders are more likely to 
make an offer, but also to whom. To assess this possibility, we run a probit regression identical to 
the one in Table V, but with interaction terms between the treatment group of the sender, and the 
                                                 
22 We have 104 men and 108 women in Session 1 and 200 men and 201 women in Session 2. Two women 
in session 2 have no desirability index. Thus, the number of potential proposals between men and women 
with a desirability index is 102,064, that is 2*104*108 plus 2*200*199. The multiplication of 2 is because 
for a given male-female pair there are two possible proposals: the man can propose to the woman and the 
woman can propose to the man.  
23 Note that, consistent with the results from Table II, we find that participants from the bottom, middle and 
top desirability group are equally likely to make an offer.  
24 Hence we have 41*108 + 124*201 potential observations for men and 23*104+90*200 for women. 17 
 
desirability group of both sender and recipient.
25 Overall, the interaction terms are not statistically 
different from zero, suggesting that participants send proposals in a similar way in all treatment 
groups (see Section 2 of the online appendix). 
TABLE V WHO SENT A PROPOSAL TO WHOM? 
  All proposals  If Sender proposed 
Sender  All  Men  Women  All  Men   Women
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
S_female  -0.003***     0.006***   
  (0.001)     (0.002)   
S_male with 8 roses  0.009***  0.010***   0.007*** 0.007***   
  (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002)   
S_female with 8 roses  0.002    0.002** 0.003   0.004**
  (0.002)    (0.001) (0.003)   (0.002)
S_female empowerment  0.001    0.001 -0.002   -0.001
  (0.001)    (0.000) (0.003)   (0.001)
S_Middle  -0.008***  -0.012*** -0.002 -0.015*** -0.019***  -0.005
  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004)
S_Top  -0.009***  -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.021*** -0.025***  -0.012***
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004)
R_Middle  0.007***  0.005* 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.010**  0.013***
  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004)
R_Top  0.012***  0.005* 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.009*  0.028***
  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.006)
S_Middle X R_Middle  0.006**  0.011** 0.000 0.012** 0.021**  -0.001
  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009)  (0.004)
S_Middle X R_Top  0.013***  0.016*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.030***  0.009
  (0.004)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010)  (0.006)
S_Top X R_Middle  0.009**  0.014** 0.004 0.018** 0.025**  0.009
  (0.004)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010)  (0.009)
S_Top X R_Top  0.022***  0.028*** 0.014** 0.043*** 0.049***  0.032*
  (0.005)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)  (0.016)
No. of proposals  102,064  51,032 51,032 49,496 29,104  20,392
Pseudo R-sq  0.065  0.065 0.1223 0.0659 0.0642  0.1506
Notes: Probit estimates. The dependent variable is one if a participant made a proposal to a given recipient 
and zero otherwise. We report marginal effects at the mean of each regressor or in the case of dummy 
variables at zero. “S_” and “R_” denote sender and recipient characteristics, respectively. For instance, 
S_female is one if a sender is female and zero otherwise. “S_Middle X R_Middle” is one if a sender 
belongs to the middle desirability group and a recipient belongs to the middle desirability group. All 
regression models control for recipient and sender’s verification level (none, medium, full), age, living in 
greater Seoul, the squared difference of age between a sender and a recipient and a dummy indicating 
whether the two are in the same location. Location has five categories: Greater Seoul, Gangwon, 
Chungcheong, Jeolla/Jeju, and Gyeungsang. Standard errors of the marginal effect are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
                                                 
25 For example, we include for female senders with eight roses the variable “S_female with eight roses X 
S_Bottom X R_Bottom” that is the indicator “S_Bottom X R_Bottom” multiplied by whether a sender is 
female and endowed with eight roses. 18 
 
 
We have seen that more desirable participants are vastly more likely to receive a 
proposal. If this is true for roses as well, we would expect participants to send roses to the most 
desirable potential mates they made an offer to. Alternatively, roses could be used as a signaling 
mechanism in a market in which time is scarce, and participants may not be certain whether the 
other party is really interested. In that case, roses may not necessarily be sent to the most 
desirable potential dating partners (see Coles, Kushnir and Niederle, 2010, and Coles et al. 
2010).
26  
Figure III.A shows for each desirability decile the fraction of proposals that came with a 
rose. The figure suggests that roses are not based on the desirability of recipients apart from 





Figure III.A: For each decile of desirability, 
where 1 is the least and 10 the most desirable 
group, the fraction of proposals accompanied 
by a rose. 
Figure III.B: For each number of received 
proposals up to 12, the fraction of proposals 
accompanied by a rose.  
 
 
In Table VI, we use a linear model to regress whether a rose accompanied a proposal on 
the characteristics of the sender and the recipient. We use the full sample for columns 1 to 3, 
while columns 4 to 6 report results for senders who sent at least one rose. The coefficients 
pertaining to the desirability of the recipient are largely not significantly different from zero, 
                                                 
26 Recall that the advice for students on the AEA website on how to use signals starts with telling them that 
they should not their top two choices. Rather, students may want to send them to departments who they 
worry may not interview them otherwise, as the departments may not realize the interest is serious enough 
to warrant one of the limited numbers of interview slots.  
27 While the high fraction of offers with roses made to bottom men is not a significant deviation, because 
very few bottom men received offers. Men in the fourth desirability decile are significantly less likely to 
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which confirms that the decision to add a rose to a proposal seems not correlated with the 
characteristics of the recipient. Only in column 1 is R_Middle significant, but the coefficient is 
not significant when we consider men and women separately, or in any other regression. The 
results are the same when we condition on participants who sent at least one rose. 
Consistent with our earlier findings in Table III, proposals from senders that had eight 
roses are more likely to be accompanied by a rose. However, neither the gender of the sender, nor 
the empowerment treatment significantly correlates with the decision to add a rose to a proposal.  
TABLE VI WHO SENT A ROSE TO WHOM? 
  All proposals  Sender sent at least one rose 
Sender  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
S_female  -0.043     0.037   
  (0.040)     (0.048)   
S_male with 8 roses  0.577*** 0.576***   0.585*** 0.584***   
  (0.025)  (0.026)   (0.027) (0.027)   
S_female with 8 roses  0.454***   0.441*** 0.463***   0.448***
  (0.043)    (0.043) (0.053)   (0.057)
S_female empowerment  -0.017    -0.009 0.016   0.022
  (0.038)    (0.038) (0.049)   (0.051)
S_Middle  0.068  0.056 0.151 0.045 0.027  0.206
  (0.062)  (0.071) (0.142) (0.066) (0.072)  (0.177)
S_Top  -0.059  -0.083 0.202 -0.066 -0.089  0.203
  (0.072)  (0.078) (0.227) (0.079) (0.083)  (0.252)
R_Middle  -0.082*  -0.049 -0.070 -0.073 -0.044  -0.036
  (0.049)  (0.056) (0.106) (0.052) (0.057)  (0.131)
R_Top  -0.027  -0.056 0.109 0.006 -0.029  0.205
  (0.049)  (0.058) (0.104) (0.053) (0.059)  (0.129)
S_Middle X R_Middle -0.012  -0.038 -0.009 -0.016 -0.039  -0.064
  (0.073)  (0.083) (0.158) (0.078) (0.085)  (0.198)
S_Middle X R_Top  -0.027  -0.033 -0.085 -0.038 -0.052  -0.136
  (0.071)  (0.084) (0.151) (0.076) (0.085)  (0.189)
S_Top X R_Middle  0.129  0.105 -0.033 0.104 0.096  -0.087
  (0.082)  (0.090) (0.240) (0.089) (0.095)  (0.269)
S_Top X R_Top  0.082  0.107 -0.177 0.074 0.107  -0.207
  (0.080)  (0.089) (0.233) (0.088) (0.095)  (0.262)
No. of proposals  1,902  1,245 657 1,615 1,153  462
Pseudo R-sq  0.280  0.300 0.220 0.280 0.310  0.250
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is one if a rose is attached to a given proposal and zero 
otherwise. “S_” and “R_” denote sender and recipient characteristics, respectively. All regression models 
control for recipient and sender’s verification level (none, medium, full), age, living in greater Seoul, the 
squared difference of age between a sender and a recipient and a dummy indicating whether the two are in 
the same location. Location has five categories: Greater Seoul, Gangwon, Chungcheong, Jeolla/Jeju, and 
Gyeungsang. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively.   
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As a final test that on average roses seem to follow proposals proportionally, we use an 
alternative measure of desirability. Specifically, Figure III.B shows the fraction of proposals 
accompanied by a rose depending on the number of proposals a participant received. When we 
define desirable participants as those who received more offers, we confirm that all participants 
have the same likelihood of having a rose attached to a proposal. This is confirmed by a 
regression that mirrors Table VI while replacing the recipient’s desirability group with the 
number of proposals a recipient received (see Section 3.1 of the online appendix).  
In a manner similar to our analysis on proposals, we examine whether the treatment 
group affects to whom proposers send a rose. We use a regression similar to the one in Table VI 
with interaction terms between the treatment group of the sender and characteristics of both the 
sender and recipient. Overall, we find no evidence that the treatment group affects to whom roses 
are sent (see Section 4 of the online appendix). 
 
IV THE EFFECT OF ROSES 
IV.A ACCEPTANCES AND THE EFFECT OF ROSES 
After the proposal stage participants had four days to respond to offers they received. 
They could accept at most 10 proposals, actively reject proposals, or simply not respond. Of the 
1,921 proposals, 295 were accepted, 445 explicitly rejected, and the remaining was not responded 
to. Among the 394 participants who received at least one proposal, 152 always gave explicit 
rejections or acceptances, 104 gave either explicit or implicit responses, and the remaining 138 
participants did not respond to any proposal. Of all proposals, 15.35 percent were accepted. Men 
accepted 20.76 percent of their proposals, which is significantly higher than the 12.53 female 
acceptance rate (p < 0.01). We had 15 couples who proposed to each other, and they all accepted 
each other, with three women not responding, however. 
The average number of acceptances among participants who received an offer is 0.8 for 
men, and 0.7 for women.
28 Even among the 16 men and 40 women who receive 10 or more 
offers, the average number of accepted offers is only 1.76 (2.25 for men and 1.58 for women, not 
significantly different). The highest number of accepted offers is 8, which implies that the 
restriction to be able to accept only 10 offers was not binding. These results suggest that 
participants have high opportunity costs of time. This would imply that there may be situations in 
which quite desirable dating partners are rejected because the participant believes the chance of a 
                                                 
28 While the average number of accepted offers is similar between women and men, women are 
significantly less likely to accept an offer than men (16 versus 29 percent, p = 0.00). This is because 
women on average receive 5.9 offers, while men only receive 3.9. 21 
 
successful date to be too low. When a participant decides which among various dating partners to 
accept, and worries about how serious the requests are, then information that a specific dating 
request is “special” might very well be taken into account. That is, an offer with a rose may have 
a higher chance to be accepted than an offer without a rose. When roses do help overcome the 
worry that a candidate is not sufficiently serious in their proposal, then we would expect this to be 
the case especially for middle and bottom desirable participants. This is because top desirable 
participants may not have to worry about being sufficiently desirable themselves. Middle and 
bottom desirable participants, however, may worry they are simply a back-up plan. As such, we 
would expect middle and bottom desirable participants to be especially responsive to roses when 
they are sent by potential dating partners who they worry may not be interested: that is by dating 
partners who are more desirable than they are.   
We start by examining the extent to which a recipient changes his or her acceptance 
decision depending on whether a proposal is accompanied by a rose. For this analysis, we 
construct a dependent variable that is one if a proposal is accepted and zero otherwise.
29 We use 
two types of regression models. In Model A we assume that all recipients react to a rose the same 
way. In Model B we allow for the possibility that the response to a rose may depend on the 
desirability of the recipient. 
We regress in Table VII the acceptance of a proposal on whether a rose is attached, 
recipient fixed effects, the sender’s age and legal verification level, a dummy whether the sender 
lives in greater Seoul, the squared age difference between the sender and the recipient and a 
dummy whether the sender and recipient live in the same location (Greater Seoul, Gangwon, 
Chungcheong, Jeolla/Jeju, and Gyeungsang). Recipient fixed effects allow for recipient specific 
reservation values when accepting a proposal. In Model A we include dummies for the 
desirability group of the sender of the proposal (S_Middle and S_Top). In Model B we include in 
addition interaction terms between receiving a rose and the desirability group of the recipient. For 
instance, “R_Bottom Rose” is one if a proposal is accompanied by a rose and sent to a bottom 
group recipient. 
Before analyzing the effect of a rose, note that both Model A and B show that the more 
desirable the sender is, the more likely a recipient accepts that proposal. For example, compared 
to a proposal from a sender in the bottom desirability group, an offer from a sender in the top 
desirability group is about 18 percentage points more likely to be accepted. For a medium group 
sender, the advantage is still around 5 percentage points. To evaluate the size of these effects note 
                                                 
29 This means we treat “no response” as an explicit rejection. In section 6 of the online appendix we present 
evidence that this is justified. 22 
 
that the overall acceptance rate of offers is 15.20 percent when we restrict attention to offers 
where both senders and recipients have a desirability index. 
 
TABLE VII EFFECT OF ROSES  
Model  FE-R  FE-R  FE-R  FE-R  OLS  FE Logit  FE-R 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Recipients  All  Men  Women  Active  All  All  2 roses 
Model A      
Rose  0.033**  0.053 0.026 0.054** 0.030* 0.443**  0.034*
  (0.016)  (0.033) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.201)  (0.018)
S_Middle  0.048**  0.066* 0.031 0.079** 0.074***  0.811***  0.052**
  (0.019)  (0.037) (0.022) (0.031) (0.020) (0.298)  (0.022)
S_Top  0.178***  0.177*** 0.175*** 0.293*** 0.191***  2.284***  0.181***
  (0.020)  (0.040) (0.023) (0.033) (0.021) (0.312)  (0.023)
R-sq (log Lik.)  0.50  0.54 0.46 0.46 0.13 -242.37  0.49
Model B      
R_Bottom Rose  0.054  0.273 0.038 0.087 0.003 0.935  0.071
  (0.047)  (0.218) (0.046) (0.071) (0.047) (0.598)  (0.052)
R_Middle Rose  0.078***  0.103 0.073*** 0.097** 0.082***  0.677**  0.068**
  (0.027)  (0.076) (0.027) (0.040) (0.029) (0.317)  (0.031)
R_Top Rose  -0.001  0.035 -0.023 0.013 0.003 0.131  0.006
  (0.021)  (0.037) (0.027) (0.035) (0.024) (0.292)  (0.024)
S_Middle  0.047**  0.066* 0.029 0.079** 0.072***  0.815***  0.051**
  (0.019)  (0.037) (0.022) (0.031) (0.020) (0.299)  (0.022)
S_Top  0.176***  0.175*** 0.174*** 0.290*** 0.189***  2.283***  0.180***
  (0.020)  (0.040) (0.023) (0.033) (0.021) (0.314)  (0.023)
No. of proposals  1,902  657 1,245 1,153 1,902 796  1,516
No. of recipients  393  168 225 226 393 103  310
R-sq (log Lik.)  0.5  0.54 0.46 0.46 0.13 -241.18  0.49
Notes: Columns labeled FE-R report OLS estimates with recipient fixed effects. FE Logit reports logit 
model estimates with recipient fixed effects. The dependent variable is one if a recipient accepted a given 
proposal and zero otherwise. “S_” and “R_” denote sender and recipient characteristics, respectively. All 
regression models control for sender’s verification level (none, medium, full), age, living in greater Seoul, 
the squared difference of age between a sender and a recipient and a dummy indicating whether the two are 
in the same location. Location has five categories: Greater Seoul, Gangwon, Chungcheong, Jeolla/Jeju, and 
Gyeungsang. Column 5 includes in addition control variables for recipient characteristics: number of 
proposals made, number of roses sent, number of proposals received, a dummy whether at least one rose 
was received, the number of roses received, and the recipient’s characteristics corresponding to those of 
senders (verification level, age, living in greater Seoul, R_Middle and R_Top). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Column 1 of Model A shows that attaching a rose significantly increases the probability 
of being accepted by 3.3 percentage points. This corresponds to a 20 percent increase compared 23 
 
to the overall acceptance rate. Furthermore, this positive effect of sending a rose is comparable to 
(and about three quarters of) the benefit of being in the middle desirability group relative to being 
in the bottom group. This implies that, by sending a rose, a bottom group sender will be almost 
equally attractive as his or her counterpart belonging to the middle group. When we restrict 
attention to male and female recipients separately, the effects only barely fail to be significant 
(columns 2 and 3). The marginal effect is, however, similar in size, and once more comparable to 
the advantage enjoyed by middle desirable senders. Furthermore, note that a one-sided test 
estimating whether roses increase the acceptance rate would yield significance.
30  
The aforementioned results are robust across various specifications and sub-samples.
 31  
In column 4, we restrict attention to recipients who actively responded to at least one proposal.
32 
In column 5, we use a linear regression model instead of a recipient fixed effects model and 
control for recipient characteristics such as the number of offers and roses both sent and received. 
In both cases, the recipient’s response to a rose is qualitatively the same as in the baseline 
analysis in column 1. Likewise, a logit regression with recipient fixed effects where we report the 
coefficients of the latent index (column 6) yields similar results.
33 Finally, we assess whether 
participants endowed with two roses react to roses differently than those endowed with eight 
roses. Column 7 shows that results are virtually unchanged when we restrict attention to 
                                                 
30 Note that, in theory, a rational participant would never attach a rose if a rose were expected to yield 
negative returns, that is reduce the chance to be accepted. In that case a participant could simply not attach 
any rose. As such, a one-sided test of the effect of a rose may be justifiable. 
31 Specifically, we perform the following two exercises (for details see Section 3 of the online appendix). 
First, instead of our baseline cutoffs (30th percentile and 70th percentile), we use the 20th and 80th 
percentile to classify participants into three desirability groups. We re-estimate Model A and find that a 
rose increases the acceptance of a proposal by 3.2 percentage points, almost identical to the baseline result. 
Second, we use the number of proposals a participant received as a proxy for the participant’s desirability. 
We re-estimate Model A but include dummy variables of the number of proposals a sender received instead 
of the desirability index group dummies. We find that a recipient accepts a proposal by 3.4 percentage 
points more if the proposal is accompanied by a rose, an effect virtually identical to the baseline result. 
32 We have 56 individuals who participated in both sessions and 39 of them received at least one proposal 
in the second session. We examine whether recipients respond to a rose differently in their second session. 
To do so, we re-estimate Model A but include the interaction between a rose and a dummy variable that 
indicates the second session and two-time participants. Note that 215 out of 1,921 proposals are sent to 
two-time participants. We find that there is no statistical difference in terms of recipients’ response to a 
rose in their second participation. 
33 We also run a regression where in addition to fixed effects for recipients we use fixed effects for senders 
instead of their desirability group. The estimated coefficient of a rose is 0.031 (p = 0.104), qualitatively the 
same as in the baseline regression (column 1), though just barely not significant (the s.e. is 0.019). 
However, we include an exceptionally large number of control variables, namely fixed effects for both 
recipients and senders, and the effect of a rose would reach conventional significance levels in a one-sided 
test. 24 
 
recipients who had only two roses compared to all recipients (column 1).
34 This is not too 
surprising, since the effect of a rose is the difference in the acceptance rate of an offer with a rose 
attached compared to an offer without a rose.
 35  
In Model B we allow for the possibility that the response to a rose may in addition 
depend on the desirability group of the recipient. Recipients in the top group of desirability have 
an overall acceptance rate of 12.03 percent, and are the most selective group. They do not appear 
to respond to roses very much as “R_Top Rose” has a coefficient close to zero. While in some 
specifications the point estimate is even slightly negative, it is never close to being significant, 
and even fails to be significant in a one-sided test. 
Column 1 of Model B shows that middle group recipients are 7.8 percentage points more 
likely to accept an offer with a rose than one without a rose. The overall acceptance rate for 
middle group recipients is 18.42 percent, so a rose results roughly in a 40 percent increase in the 
acceptance rate. Furthermore, under all specifications, the effect of attaching a rose is similar and 
generally larger than the effect of moving a sender from the bottom to the middle desirability 
group (which is 4.7 percentage points in column 1). The only case in which a rose fails to 
generate a significant effect is when we restrict attention to male recipients (column 2). The effect 
of a rose, however, is large, and significant in a one-sided test.  
Recipients in the bottom desirability group overall have a positive response to a rose of 
5.4 percentage points, but the effect is not significant. However, participants in the bottom group 
only received a small fraction of all offers (12.04 percent) which may account for the large 
standard errors. Note that in almost all specifications the effect of a rose is similar in size to the 
increase in the acceptance rate when the sender is from the middle rather than bottom desirability 
group. Since the overall acceptance rate for bottom participants is 19.21 percent, a 5 percentage 
point increase corresponds to an about 25 percent increase. Furthermore, in many specifications, 
significance would be achieved in a one-sided test. 
                                                 
34 We also formally test whether the effect of roses on the acceptance rate depends on a recipient’s 
treatment group. We re-estimate Model A while including an interaction term between receiving a rose and 
whether a recipient had 8 or 2 roses. The coefficient on the interaction term is not significant, indicating 
that roses are treated similarly by recipients who themselves had 2 or 8 roses, see Section 5 of the online 
appendix.  
35 Participants who had two roses may view an offer with a rose as “special”, while offers without a rose 
show maybe “normal” interest. On the other hand, participants who had eight roses may not feel equally 
flattered when receiving a rose. However, for them, not receiving a rose may be a sign of really not being 
special, since, in their view, only 2 out of 10 offers were precluded from having a rose attached. Note that 
these two cases are in a way symmetric: either two out of ten offers are more special compared to other 
offers - for recipients endowed with two roses – or two out of ten offers are less special compared to other 
offers - for recipients endowed with eight. Due to that symmetry it may not be surprising that the change in 
the acceptance rate in reaction to a rose is similar for recipients endowed with two or eight roses. 25 
 
TABLE VIII EFFECT OF ROSES 
Model  FE-R  FE-R  FE-R  FE-R  OLS  FE Logit  FE-R 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Recipients  All  Men  Women  Active  All  All  2 roses 
R_Bottom      
S_Bottom: Rose  -0.052  0.163 -0.059 -0.076 -0.024 -1.522  -0.041
  (0.064)  (0.311) (0.062) (0.096) (0.063) (1.401)  (0.074)
S_Middle Rose  0.125*  0.500 0.103 0.189* -0.001 1.883*  0.122
  (0.070)  (0.311) (0.068) (0.107) (0.068) (0.962)  (0.076)
S_Top Rose  0.160*  0.075 0.136* 0.275** 0.072 2.889**  0.170*
  (0.084)  (0.452) (0.081) (0.137) (0.087) (1.463)  (0.086)
R_Middle      
S_Bottom Rose  0.106**  0.211 0.089* 0.150* 0.076 1.246*  0.083
  (0.049)  (0.151) (0.050) (0.078) (0.050) (0.669)  (0.058)
S_Middle Rose  0.019  -0.074 0.039 0.018 0.065 0.247  0.011
  (0.039)  (0.118) (0.040) (0.059) (0.041) (0.464)  (0.045)
S_Top Rose  0.124***  0.209* 0.102** 0.151** 0.108** 0.892*  0.116**
  (0.040)  (0.112) (0.041) (0.060) (0.045) (0.464)  (0.045)
R_Top            
S_Bottom Rose  -0.003  -0.030 0.008 -0.001 0.01 -0.654  0.018
  (0.044)  (0.081) (0.052) (0.070) (0.046) (0.919)  (0.051)
S_Middle Rose  0.034  0.058 0.021 0.06 0.026 0.57  0.033
  (0.032)  (0.054) (0.040) (0.051) (0.035) (0.425)  (0.036)
S_Top Rose  -0.033  0.040 -0.072* -0.031 -0.025 -0.069  -0.022
  (0.032)  (0.058) (0.037) (0.053) (0.035) (0.394)  (0.035)
S_Middle  0.041*  0.057 0.023 0.071* 0.069*** 0.677*  0.047*
  (0.023)  (0.043) (0.028) (0.037) (0.024) (0.368)  (0.026)
S_Top  0.171***  0.159*** 0.175*** 0.281*** 0.188*** 2.182***  0.174***
  (0.024)  (0.046) (0.029) (0.039) (0.026) (0.370)  (0.027)
No. of proposals  1902  657  1245  1153  1902  796  1516 
No. of recipients  394  168  226  227  393  104  310 
R-sq (log Lik)  0.50  0.55  0.47  0.47  0.13  -234.80  0.49 
Notes: Columns labeled FE-R report OLS estimates with recipient fixed effects. FE Logit reports logit model 
estimates with recipient fixed effects. FE-S&R reports OLS estimates with fixed effects for both recipients and 
senders. The dependent variable is one if a recipient accepted a given proposal and zero otherwise. “S_” and 
“R_” denote sender and recipient characteristics, respectively. All regression models control for sender’s 
verification level (none, partial, full), age, living in greater Seoul, the squared difference of age between a sender 
and a recipient and a dummy indicating whether the two are in the same location. Location has five categories: 
Greater Seoul, Gangwon, Chungcheong, Jeolla/Jeju, and Gyeungsang. Instead of recipient-fixed effects, column 
5 includes in addition control variables for recipient characteristics: number of proposals made, number of roses 
sent, number of proposals received, a dummy whether at least one rose was received, the number of roses 
received, and the recipient’s characteristics corresponding to those of senders (verification level, age, living in 
greater Seoul, R_Middle and R_Top). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 26 
 
In Table VIII we allow for the possibility that the effect of attaching a rose on the 
acceptance rate depends on both the recipient’s and the sender’s desirability group. The most 
notable result is that for all recipients, the effect of a rose is positive and significant when the 
sender is from a desirability group strictly greater than the responder, see column 1. That is, 
bottom recipients react significantly (both economically and statistically) to roses when they are 
attached to offers from medium and top desirable participants. For middle desirable recipients the 
effect of a rose on the acceptance rate of an offer is positive and significant when the offer is 
made by a participant from the top desirability group. The effect is always more than twice the 
increase in acceptance when moving as a sender from the bottom to the middle desirability group. 
Column 1 shows the effect to be more than a 50% increase in acceptance rate for either the 
bottom or middle recipients. 
The only surprising result is that offers from top desirable senders to top desirable 
recipients have a slightly lower chance to be accepted when a rose is attached. This effect is 
particularly large when looking at female responders. It is as if very desirable women do not 
favor men who are both desirable and interested. Finally, note that for all desirability groups of 
responders, the effect of roses is in general lower for senders that have the same desirability 
group as the receiver. 
To summarize, on the proposal level, an offer with a rose is almost twenty percent more 
likely to be accepted than an offer without a rose. Further analysis shows that the positive effect 
of a rose is driven by bottom and middle desirable recipients, who increase their acceptance rate 
by about 25 and 40 percent, respectively. In both cases, attaching a rose increases the chance to 
be accepted by more than if the sender were to move from the bottom to the middle desirability 
group. Finally, an even more detailed analysis shows that an offer made from a sender who is in a 
superior desirability group compared to the recipient is always significantly, both statistically and 
economically, more likely to be accepted  when a rose is attached. The effect of a rose 
corresponds to a more than 50 percent increase in the acceptance rate. 
 
IV.B THE EFFECT OF ROSES FOR PROPOSERS 
In this section we assess whether roses help proposers be more successful. Proposers may 
be deemed more “successful” if they are more likely to have a date or have more dates. However, 
maybe an even more accurate measure is to consider dates initiated by the proposer. First, 
proposers may be even more excited about dates they initiated independent of the desirability 
index of the dating partner. Second, initiated dates that are accepted may more accurately reflect 
the effect of roses on the senders’ success to convince recipients to accept their offer.   27 
 
To assess whether roses help proposers to have more initiated dates we perform two 
analyses. First, we analyze whether participants who received eight roses are more successful 
than those that received only two roses. Second, we use the results from the regression analysis in 
the previous section IV.A to predict the outcome of participants if they had no roses, and confirm 
that we would then expect participants to be worse off. In this section, all our tests will be one-
sided, since we assess whether roses help participants have their proposed dates be accepted. 
First, we assess the treatment effect of endowing some participants with eight roses. For 
men, we compare participants who had two roses (baseline and empowerment treatment) to those 
with eight roses, where we restrict attention to men who live in greater Seoul and have full 
verification. This is because men in different treatments differed in their observables (see Section 
II.C).
36  Furthermore, the male empowerment treatment took place in the response stage, that is 
men in the baseline and the empowerment treatment should not differ in their proposal behavior 
and as such in outcomes corresponding to initiated dates.
  Since there are no observable 
differences among women in various treatment groups, we use all female observations. We 
compare outcomes among women who had two roses and were subjected to empowerment – that 
is women in the empowerment treatment to women who had eight roses since the latter group was 
also subjected to the empowerment treatment. The empowerment condition was administered in 
the proposal stage and hence could affect proposal behavior – though as we saw not in a 
significant way.  
  Table IX shows the outcomes of male and female participants. Men are significantly 
more likely to have a date they initiated (that is an offer of theirs that got accepted) when they 
have eight roses, in fact that chance increases by more than 50%. Furthermore, men have 
significantly more dates they initiated when they are endowed with eight roses; the increase is by 
more than 60%.
37 Finally, participants may not only care about the total number of dates, but 
prefer dates with more desirable partners. We therefore quality-adjust each proposal. For each 
proposer we compute the weight of a proposal as the desirability index of the recipient divided by 
the average desirability index of participants who received at least one proposal. Men with eight 
                                                 
36 In section II.C we showed that men with eight roses are significantly less likely to be special members 
and hence significantly more likely to have a full verification level, than men endowed with two roses. 
Note that offers from participants with full verification are more likely to be accepted than other offers. 
However, when we condition on the verification level, and whether men are from greater Seoul then there 
are no more differences in observables between the two groups. Furthermore, since for these two categories 
the modal group is greater Seoul (87.50  percent) and full verification (70.72 percent) we restrict all male 
participants to have these characteristics. Jointly over 64 percent of male participants live in greater Seoul 
and provide full legal documentation and hence have a full verification level. 
37 When looking at all dates, not just those initiated by the sender, men with eight roses are still 
significantly more likely to have at least one date (34%, significant at the 5% level) and have significantly 
more dates (55% more, significant at 5%). 28 
 
roses have about 60% more quality-adjusted first dates than men with two roses. For women, the 
chance to have an initiated date increases from 26.3% to 32.8% when they have eight roses, but 
this 25% increase is not significant. Like men, women have significantly more initiated dates 
when endowed with eight roses; the increase is by more than 60%. Furthermore, when quality-
adjusting dates, the result remains virtually unchanged.
38  
TABLE IX TREATMENT EFFECTS 
  Baseline Roses Increase 
Men (Groups 1&2 vs 3)
  No obs 144 39  
Have at least one initiated date  0.313 0.487 56%** 
No of initiated dates  0.556 0.897 61%** 
Quality adj. no of initiated dates 0.535 0.868 62%** 
Men who made at least one offer  79 30  
Have at least one initiated date  0.570 0.633 11% 
No of initiated dates   1.013 1.167 15% 
Quality adj. no of initiated dates 0.975 1.128 16% 
      
Women (Group 2 vs. 3)  95 61  
Have at least one initiated date  0.263 0.328 25% 
No of initiated dates  0.421 0.705 67%** 
Quality adj. no of initiated dates 0.403 0.688 71%** 
Women who made at least one offer 36 26  
Have at least one initiated date  0.694 0.769 11% 
No of initiated dates  1.111 1.654 49%** 
Quality adj. no of initiated dates 1.063 1.614 52%** 
Notes: Male participants include only men who live in greater Seoul and provided a full level of legal 
documentation. *, **, and *** indicate that the p-value of testing the increase in column 3, between the 
value in column 1 to the value in column 2 is significant at less than 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
  In section III.B we showed that participants with eight roses are similar in their proposal 
behavior to participants endowed with two roses, with the exception that men endowed with eight 
roses are more likely to make at least one proposal. To assess whether this is the main driving 
factor in Table IX, we provide the outcomes based on the subset of participants who made at least 
one offer. While both men and women are still about 10% more likely to have a date they 
initiated when they are endowed with eight roses, the difference is not significant anymore. 
Women still have about 50% more first dates they initiated when they are endowed with eight 
roses, a significant increase. For men, the increase is still 15%, but fails to be significant. Note, 
however, that the sample becomes small. The results remain virtually unchanged when quality-
adjusting those dates.  
  A second way to assess whether the use of roses increases the chances for proposers to 
                                                 
38 When looking at all dates, not just those initiated by the sender, women with eight roses are only 1% 
more likely to have a date, and have only 12% more dates. 29 
 
have dates they initiated is to use the results from the analysis in section IV.A. We focus on 
participants who made at least one proposal. The row “Data” in Panel 1 of Table X shows the 
average number of accepted proposals for each proposer. Next, we use the regression results from 
Table VIII – column 2 for men and column 3 for women to predict for each proposer the 
likelihood with which his or her proposal is accepted. We aggregate results on the proposer level 
and present the outcome in the row “model prediction” with two-sided t-tests in parentheses that 
compare those outcomes. There is no significant difference between the predicted and actual 
number of accepted proposals. We therefore use the model to compute two counterfactuals. First, 
we predict the outcome if a participant had not used any of his or her available roses. In that case, 
we predict proposers to only have 0.962, instead of the actual 1.057 accepted offers, a significant 
drop of 9% (see column 1). When we consider women and men separately, the drop in accepted 
offers is basically the same (8% for men and 10% for women) but only the female drop is 
significant. 
  If on the other hand proposers had used roses in order to maximize the number of accepted 
offers, they would have had significantly more acceptances, namely 1.179, a significant 12% 
increase compared to the actual outcome. This increase remains significant even when we look at 
women and men separately. Furthermore, compared to not using any roses, the date maximizing 
use of roses results in an increase of initiated dates of 23%. Once more the effects are similar in 
size and significant when we look at each gender separately. 
  While participants may prefer that more of their offers be accepted, they may have a 
preference over which offers are accepted. Specifically, they may prefer that offers to more rather 
than those to less desirable participants are accepted. We therefore use the same quality-
adjustment for each proposal as before. The weight of a proposal is the desirability index of the 
recipient divided by the average desirability index of participants who received at least one 
proposal. We then compute the probability with which a proposal is accepted times its weight and 
for each proposer we sum these probabilities. Panel 3 shows that the average quality-adjusted 
number of initiated dates is 1.019 for all participants who made at least one proposal, a number 
that our model matches exactly. This match is equally good when analyzing women and men 
separately. In the first row of panel 4, we report the quality-adjusted number of accepted 
proposals if senders had not used any roses. When we consider all participants, they would have 
about 8 percent less quality-adjusted initiated dates, a significant difference. The numbers for 
women and men separately are the same, though the 8% drops are not significant anymore. In 
terms of using roses to maximize quality-adjusted dates, compared to not using any roses, both 
women and men would have about 25% less dates. Compared to their actual outcomes, both 30 
 
women and men are not close, on average, to an optimal usage of roses. 
TABLE X PREDICTING THE EFFECT OF ROSES  
Senders  All Men Women
No. accepted proposals     
Panel 1. Actual     
 (i) Data  1.057 0.958 1.202
 (ii) Model Prediction  1.047 0.958 1.175
      (ii) vs. (i)  (-1% / .428) (0% / .500)  (-2% / .398)
Panel 2. Counterfactuals     
 (iii) Not using roses  0.962  0.881 1.079
       (iii) vs. (i)  (-9% / .047) (-8% / .139)  (-10% / .096)
 (iv) Optimal use of roses  1.179 1.055 1.357
      (iv) vs. (i)   (12% / .026) (10% / .091)  (13% / .076)
      (iv) vs. (iii)   (23% / .000) (20% / .009)  (26% / .006)
Quality-Adjusted No. accepted proposals     
Panel 3. Actual      
 (i) Data  1.019 0.927 1.153
 (ii) Model Prediction  1.019 0.927 1.153
      (ii) vs. (i)  (0% / .500) (0% / .500)  (0% / .500)
Panel 4. Counterfactuals     
 (iii) Not using roses  0.940 0.856 1.061
       (iii) vs. (i)  (-8% / .075) (-8% / .149)  (-8% / .159)
 (iv) Optimal use of roses  1.173 1.055 1.344
      (iv) vs. (i)   (15% / .006) (14% / .039)  (17% / .034)
      (iv) vs. (iii)   (25% / .000) (23% / .003)  (27% / .004)
Notes: In parentheses we the percentage change of the two relevant variables, and the p-value of the 
corresponding one-sided t-test. Tests that compare the data versus the model prediction are two-sided, that 
is (ii) versus (i), as they don’t test the effect of adding a rose. 
 
IV.C ROLE OF ROSES: SUBSTITUTION OR INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF DATES 
Finally, we want to assess whether there is some indication that roses increase the number of 
proposals a recipient accepts, or whether they mostly serve to direct acceptances towards offers 
with roses and solely displace other acceptances. When a recipient shifts his or her acceptance 
from an offer without a rose to an offer with a rose by senders of the same desirability, they are 
likely to shift the acceptance to someone who may be more interested. However, that introduces a 
negative externality to the sender who did not use a rose. If, however, recipients who receive 
roses accept more offers, roses may help increase the total number of dates, not only shift dates 
around, and so, perhaps, help in the final goal to match as many participants as possible. To 
assess whether roses change the total number of acceptances, consider the following thought 
experiment. Take two identical recipients who have the same number of offers, with, however, 
one recipient having received at least one rose while the other received none. Will the former 
accept more offers? To perform this analysis, we need to restrict ourselves to a sample where 
participants, while receiving the same number of offers, are about equally likely to have at least 31 
 
one rose or no rose. This is the case for middle desirable recipients who have received up to three 
offers. This corresponds to 60.25 percent of all middle recipients who received an offer.  
  In Table XI we use a linear regression on how many offers participants accepted depending 
on whether they received at least one rose. Overall, participants who received at least one rose 
accept 0.259 more offers than those who received no rose. For that group, each responder accepts 
on average 0.412 proposals, hence this corresponds to a 37 percent increase. Note that this effect 
is almost entirely driven by men. 
 
TABLE XI ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIVING A ROSE 
  All Men Women 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Receive at least one rose  0.259* 0.484** 0.087 
  (0.139) (0.237) (0.156) 
Female  -0.335**   
  (0.133)   
Constant  0.488*** 0.432*** 0.231** 
  (0.097) (0.117) (0.106) 
No. obs  97 49 48 
R-sq  0.080 0.081 0.007 
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the number of proposals that a recipient accepted. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper presented a field experiment in internet dating that showed that preference 
signaling can affect outcomes. In preference signaling, as opposed to costly signaling, 
every agent can send signals for free, where each signal is sent to one participant on the 
other side of the market. The number of signals each agent can send is limited, which 
makes them meaningful. Preference signaling is widely used in many markets in which 
offering an interview (or a date) to evaluate a candidate, or offering a job is costly. 
Interview costs can arise because slots are limited, or the time spent on interviews or 
dates is valuable. Offers can be costly either because they are limited, because they take a 
long time to make or resolve and alternate candidates are meanwhile taken off the 
market, or because having an offer rejected is a bad signal for the proposer.
39 When 
                                                 
39 While we have presented many examples pertaining to interviews being costly, preference signaling can 
also help when making offers is costly. For example, in many economic departments deans limit the 
number of offers a department can make. In many markets, especially entry-level labor markets, making 
offers to candidates and being rejected after a while is costly, as during that time other desirable candidates 
may have already accepted positions elsewhere. This is a reason offers often come with a short deadline 32 
 
interviews or offers are costly, agents may take information pertaining to the likelihood 
that an offer will be accepted into account. Preference signaling can help convey such 
information (see Coles, Kushnir and Niederle, 2011).  
  In the dating experiment we had participants who were young, never married, 
college educated Koreans. This group seems to have high opportunity costs of time, 
which is reflected in the relatively low number of dates they accepted. In the experiment, 
participants when proposing a date could attach a rose to indicate their special interest. 
We showed that attaching a rose significantly increased the chance that an offer was 
accepted. Overall, the effect corresponds to a twenty percent increase in the acceptance 
rate, which is similar to the increase in the acceptance rate when the offer is made by a 
candidate from the middle rather than the bottom desirability group. A more detailed 
analysis shows that roses alter the acceptance behavior whenever a recipient considers an 
offer from a sender who is more desirable than the recipient. That is, middle group 
recipients significantly increase their acceptance of dating requests from top senders 
when a rose is attached, and bottom recipients do so, when the offer is from a top or 
middle desirable sender and comes with a rose. In all three cases the effect corresponds to 
more than a 50% increase in the acceptance rate, and is about twice the increase in the 
acceptance rate when an offer is made by a middle rather than bottom desirable sender. 
Considering the effects of signals on proposers, we show that participants who received 
eight roses, instead of two, had significantly more accepted dates. This result holds when 
we impose some quality-adjustment on dates. Simulations confirm that, in an 
environment in which agents have signals, not using them makes agents worse off, in that 
they have fewer of their proposals accepted, while having more signals results in more 
accepted proposals. Furthermore, we found that roses seem to increase the number of 
offers that are accepted, which means they do not only substitute acceptances away from 
offers without roses.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(Avery et al. 2001, Niederle, Proctor and Roth, 2006, Roth, 2008, and Niederle and Roth, 2009). While 
anecdotal evidence suggests that in many markets the chances a candidate would accept an offer influences 
the decisions over whom to make an offer, this has been explicitly documented in the market for law clerks 
(Avery et al., 2001) and the market for medical fellows (Niederle, Proctor and Roth, 2006). While 
rejections may be costly for many participants, this was especially the case in college admission where the 
yield rate has been explicitly used to rank colleges by the US news and World report and is still available 
on their website where they declare it as “one of the best indicators or a school’s popularity”.  33 
 
  Like any other empirical signaling paper, on costly signaling or preference 
signaling, we cannot assess whether the signaling mechanism improved welfare. While 
one can show in theory that preference signals can improve welfare (see Avery and 
Levin, 2009, Coles, Kushnir and Niederle, 2011), this is hard to do empirically for many 
reasons. Foremost is that the welfare criterion is not obvious. How should various dates 
be traded off? Would it be better to have one date per person, or a few participants with 
more dates, and some with fewer? Even counting the total number of dates may not be a 
good measure, as clearly some dates are more desirable than others. This may be either 
because the dating partner is more desirable, or because the dating partner is more 
interested, so the date is more likely to result in a long term relationship. Even if one 
were to simply count the number of dates, maybe weighted by desirability, it would be 
hard to assess how many additional dates occurred because of the signaling mechanism. 
  Indeed, in many markets, the right comparison may not be between the outcome 
with a preference signaling mechanism and one in which preference signaling is not 
possible. This is because in many markets in which offers (for interviews or positions) 
are costly, there already are ways and channels through which participants transmit 
preferences. In the economics job market, for example, it is through advisors and their 
connections that graduate students on the market can convey their interest. In the law 
clerk market, law appellate court judges seem to be able to receive binding commitments 
from law students (see Avery et al., 2001). In college admission, preferences for a college 
can be conveyed through the choice of the single university to which the student applies 
through early action, where high schools seem to enforce that students do not apply to 
more than one college early (Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser, 2003). Preferences can 
also be conveyed by using one of the weekends to visit the university, universities in turn 
seem to take such visits into account when deciding whom to admit.
40 When using 
market design to introduce a signaling mechanism, the question may therefore be how the 
new signals will change the existing mechanisms. In the economics junior market, the 
signaling through the AEA website allows students to signal to any place, not solely the 
                                                 
40 Numerous websites advise students to show interest by visiting the college. For example, collegedata, at 
(http://www.collegedata.com/cs/content/content_getinarticle_tmpl.jhtml?articleId=10045), claims that a 
factor that is of considerably importance to colleges is: “Demonstrated interest. Going on a college visit, 
talking with admission officers, or doing an enthusiastic interview can call attention to how much you 
really want to attend. Applying for an early decision may also make a good impression.” 34 
 
ones to which their advisors have connections. It may therefore serve to equalize the 
opportunities among students with various levels of connections (see Coles et al. 2010). 
In college admission, early applications may result in a loss of information, and this 
unraveling could change who is able to get into what college. If preference signaling is an 
important factor, one way would be for an organization, such as the National Association 
for College Admission Counseling to offer a signaling mechanism similar to the one used 
by the economics junior market.  
  Market design has so far mostly focused on turning decentralized markets into 
centralized ones, such as the market for medical residents and fellows (see Roth 1984 and 
Roth and Peranson 1999).
41 Market design may be ready to help decentralized markets 
operate differently. One such way is to introduce preference signaling. This paper showed 
that preference signaling can work. In a market in which interviews are costly, and in 
which agents can signal their preferences, this paper showed that signals do affect who 
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